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Abstract 
The Malaysian civil service for so long has maintained the tradition of being politically neutral. 
However, maintaining impartiality throughout is relatively difficult especially when a ruling 
political party has been at the helm of political power for a very long time. In other words, it is 
not easy to break the close relationship the Malaysian politicians and the government’s senior 
officers have built as a result of the ruling political party’s uninterrupted years in power since 
the country’s independence in 1957. The objective of this paper is to analyze the capacity and 
the professionalism of the Malaysian civil service, particularly the Malaysian senior civil 
servants. The paper argues, among factors that have the inherent possibility and aptitude to 
compromise the capacity and professionalism of the top management are; (i) political executive 
dominance, (ii) ‘ethnicized civil service’ and (iii) new mechanism of public governance.  
Keywords: Malaysian civil service, professionalism, senior public servants, new governance  
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Looking at the structure of today’s Malaysian government, it is sensible to assume that its policy-
making is no longer treated as the politicians’ exclusive domain because the bureaucrats also 
have their own room to operate in public policy making process i.e. through the given 
discretionary power. Senior public servants do not only perform routine duties. Equipped with a 
high creativity talent, they make their choices of decisions based on readily available courses of 
actions or policies. At present, Malaysian political leaders, to an extent, tend to be ‘very 
generous’ when it comes to delegating power to senior public servants (Milne 1967). It needs to 
be stressed, however, that this situation clearly falls within the domain of the country’s federal 
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constitution, designed as such under the assumption that democracy runs in its purest form 
provided that the government of the day does not misuse its position and/or the public agencies 
to exert illegal or immoral type of pressures onto democratic forces running within the system in 
order to, for example, suppress dissension. Ideally, civil servants should be the protector of the 
people from being abused by the ruling government. This is where the true purpose of civil 
servants lies, that is to provide the necessary expertise and professional advice in which any act 
of breach or incompliance, if any, can be declared as illegal by the court of law (Abdul Aziz 
2006: 131).  
 
However, such a generosity had so greatly overshadowed the boundary of power between 
politics and administration. It is difficult to tell if one is a politician or a civil servant. In addition 
to that, granting absolute discretion could also lead to ethical dilemma, especially when it is 
made based on personal tendency, sympathy for one particular party or even greed which would 
then lead to all facts and rationality being ruled out completely (Ayee 1998)10. Invariably, such a 
peculiar tendency tends to come about when a political party has been in power for so long that it 
has become so difficult to tell the differences between a politician and a civil servant. There 
seems to be an extreme closeness between the ruling politicians with the senior civil servants. 
Looking on from another perspective, one can find instances where the senior civil servants are 
the ones attempting to get as close as possible with the ruling political party members, hoping to 
get something in return such as being appointed to senior posts within the service. Pierre (1995: 
3) writes:  
 
“On the one hand we see policy-makers using administrative reform to displace 
accountability for public policy; on the other hand we see the very same policy- 
makers trying to increase their control over bureaucracy. Whilst this appears to be 
two inconsistent developments, they may in fact reflect a general desire among 
elected politicians to increase over bureaucracy while at the same time avoiding 
responsibility for the bureaucrats’ action.” 
  
There exist a number of paradoxes or anomalies relating to senior public servants’ discretionary 
power with that of political control in which both of these elite political and bureaucratic forces 
mutually taking advantages of their own powers, and thereby, avoiding the bureaucracy’s basic 
responsibility i.e. to serve the people. This paper will provide an in-depth discussion of several 
factors that compromise professionalism and the capacity of the civil servants. A succinct 
overview of the civil service background shall precede the discussion. 
 
2.0 The Background of Malaysian Civil Service; An Overview 
For over than 50 years after independence, the country has gone through its democratic processes 
by translating the people’s mandate given to the politicians into political and social objectives. 
Even though the current government has won the people’s mandate and as such holds the 
executive power, it is the civil service which, in actuality runs the government’s businesses and 
routines. Today, Malaysia’s civil service has more than a million staffs on its payroll. For a 
country with 28 million populations, the huge numbers of the civil servants speak a volume of 
                                                            
10 It is also considered as the abuse of discretion following the failure to consider facts and laws related with 
arbitrary process or deviate from precedent or court practice (West Encyclopaedia of American Law 2009), also 
treated as bribery (Kernagham 1980; Henekon 1986). On this basis, professionalism is the way it is promoted by 
Weber (1947). 
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considerable strength and influence. The public service is headed by the Chief Secretary to the 
Government (KSN).  The KSN heads a hierarchy comprising a premier group, a professional and 
management group and two groups of support staff. Within the premier, professional and 
management group, a prominent role is played by the Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic 
Officers (Pegawai Tadbir dan Diplomatik). The premier group are the top management, 
currently numbers at 1898 (0.14%), serving in the Federal Government service while a small 
numbers of them are seconded to State Governments (JPA 2005). They are the high ranking 
officers who are very influential with powers to make and determine ideas related to public 
policy11. 
As a parliamentary democratic country, the role of public service is to provide expertise and for 
that reason, it needs to be partial and neutral in its governance (Abdul Aziz 2003). Thus, the 
Federal Constitution outlines several clauses to protect the civil servants. The purpose, among 
others, is to maintain and defend the service’s professionalism so that the civil servants will be 
able to serve their duties proficiently. Among the provisions are:  
i- Article 144 – the formation of Special Commission responsible for matters relating to 
appointment, promotion, discipline and dismissal;  
ii- Article 136 – assurance of all civil servants receiving fair treatment regardless of ethnicity; 
and 
iii- Article 135 – enjoying the guarantee of service term; and impediment to dismissal and 
demotion; as well as the opportunity to self-defend upon legal conviction (Abdul Aziz & 
Farid Suffian 2004). 
Moreover, the rule of the General Order based on Act 132 (2) mentions that top management and 
professional group are not allowed to be involved in political activities. Nevertheless, this rule 
does not prevent these officers from joining political parties as ordinary members provided that 
they have informed beforehand their respective departmental heads as such. This is in line with 
Article 10 in the federal constitution which informs about the right of association (Abdul Aziz 
2006). Pursuant to that, the constitution sets out clear guidelines in order to keep civil servants, 
especially the administrators, from being involved in partisan politics.   
3.0 Factors Undermining Professionalism And Capacity Of The Malaysian Senior Civil 
Servants 
3.1 Domination of the Political Executive  
In the past, the civil service used to recruit its staff based on the criteria of merit, fairness and 
openness. Aside from the Westminster factor inherited from the colonial administration that 
stressed much upon political impartiality freedom, the ‘newly formed’ government has put more 
emphasis on security issue and the people’s development. Back then, generally, it was common 
for the government to empower politicians to draft and make national policy while the civil 
servants are given the responsibility to execute it. Corruption was almost unheard of at that time 
as the civil servants were known to be very committed and transparent in discharging their 
duties.  
Nevertheless, in 1998, the Malaysian civil service’s good faith reputation was faced with first 
major test following the sacking of the incumbent Deputy Prime Minister, Dato’ Seri Anwar 
Ibrahim from the government cabinet (Abdullah Sanusi et al 2003). As a result of the incident, a 
number of civil servants were arrested for joining several illegal gatherings which opposed the 
                                                            
11 This category may include the The Chief Secretary to the Government (KSN),  the Secretaries General Ministry 
(KSU), State Secretary (SUK) and so forth.  
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sacking. There were suspicions that a number of the public agencies, including some 
government-owned banks did leak out some official documents while a number of civil servants 
rebelled against the ruling government even while carrying out their official duties. Not only did 
this event lead some politicians setting up their own separate political parties, for example, Parti 
Keadilan Nasional (People’s Justice Party), it also shook the very foundation of the civil 
servants’ belief in the political system. In the national 1999 election, held soon after the sacking 
of Anwar Ibrahim, as many as 650,000 civil servants voted for the opposition (Abdullah Sanusi 
et al 2003). 
 
The second major test came in 2008 election, after which the status quos of four state 
governments in the Malaysia peninsular were taken over by the opposition pact, hitherto known 
as Pakatan Rakyat (the People’s Coalition). One of the most notable differences, as far as the 
state’s civil service is concerned, the policy makers of the state governments of Selangor, Pulau 
Pinang, Kedah and Perak were no longer from the ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front 
Party) but the Pakatan Rakyat of which member parties included the People's Justice Party 
(PKR), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS).  
 
As much as there were civil servants whose professionalism remained unchanged by the change 
in the state’s administration, there also existed civil servants whose loyalty remained with the 
previous BN state governments. As the loyalty divide of the civil servants began to appear more 
visible, so were problems in the administration ranks. Following the change in state governments 
in the four states, the commotion during the State Assembly of Perak (now under BN 
government due to political defections two years after the 2008 election) - allegedly conspired by 
the state secretary and a member of the Malaysian Royal Police Force - was proof of an 
unusually extreme loyalty sentiments of which unfortunately, was not something new.  
 
Interference on the basis of arbitration is also very obvious other state, for instance in Sabah, 
whereby senior officers were often transferred every time such a change in the state leadership 
occurred. When Terengganu State Government of UMNO (United Malays National 
Organization), a founding member of BN was replaced by that of PAS in 1999 General Election, 
it was reported that some state secretaries and several other senior officers were forced to retire 
early.  
 
Fundamentally, this condition was perpetuated by the existence of strong separation of power 
between the state governments with Public Service Commission (SPA) which runs the civil 
service (Abdullah et al 2003). Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that civil servants do not have 
to pledge loyalty to the ruling government. They only need to execute or carry out any orders 
which do not contradict the constitution. Civil servants have to be loyal to the country, not the 
government (Abdul Aziz 2009).     
 
Undeniably, power is the essence of an effective government. It all began after the introduction 
of New Economic Policy (NEP)12 sprang out of 1969 ethnic riot. The leadership at that time was 
in dire need of an extremely strong, overarching and powerful government (Lim 2002). At that 
time, the ruling trend has taken the turn into strong inclination for authoritarian or loyalty to the 
                                                            
12 The NEP was an ambitious policy aimed at eradicating poverty and restructuring the society.  Although the NEP 
was hailed in some quarters as having reduced the socioeconomic disparity between the Chinese minority and Malay 
majority, others accused it of having reduced non-Malays to the status of second-class citizens by cementing 
ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy). The NEP is often invoked as part of the Malay Agenda, which is in turn part 
of the Malaysian social contract granting Malays special rights in return for citizenship for non-Malays. 
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ruling government13. If such domination continues consistently, it is feared that the power of the 
politicians will eventually override that of the government agencies such as the Parliament, 
amend constitution, limit the power of the court of law, power of Agong, the constitutional 
monarch and even remove the related restrictions enshrined in the constitution (Lim 2002). 
Along with the ‘fall of the institution’, it also brought down many other things with it including 
the bureaucrats. Therefore, UMNO’s approach of civil service administration only circled around 
and only on ‘committed’ civil servants whose loyalty is nothing but guaranteed when it comes to 
implementing the law and executing the party’s policy. Various strategies have been adopted in 
order to increase the party’s grip of control over the civil servants to ensure their undivided 
loyalty and compliance. Among strategies adopted are favourable tender allocation, divide and 
rule policy of the opposition, selective prosecution of the opposition and an obscure police force 
that do their ominous bidding.  
The appointment of political secretary to ‘advise and monitor’ civil servants as well as the 
appointment of a number of the government’s senior civil servants, based on the party’s 
recommendation, were made on the wrong grounds. The reason is that, this approach plays a 
vital role in reshaping the bureaucrats’ neutrality into that of more ‘committed’ ones. Political 
influence over the civil service process of appointment, especially for the high ranking senior 
posts have become ever more rampant. This practice seems to suggest that the authority is the 
only one who possesses the absolute power to authorize and appoint officers in the expense of 
the long established rules and standard code of practise. In other words, this also seems to 
present a scenario to the general masses that patronage is a common practice in the civil service.  
For example, more often than  not, for the post of KSN, the eventual holder has always been 
picked out from a number of shortlisted directors of civil service, only absent in the case Halim 
and Tan Sri Sallehuddin Mohamed, the country’s KSNs preceding Tan Sri Ahmad Sarji (Abdul 
Aziz 2006: 133). Beside the appointment issue, the other issue that demands a much closer look 
is the manner with which the service termination of the senior civil servants takes place. Some of 
them will accept normal transfer orders; some are put into ‘cold storage’ while some will have 
their retirement extended. Despite these being allowed by the service’s rules and regulations, 
they also could run counter against the supposedly neutral position and role of the civil service 
because the civil servants will tend to feel indebted and therefore will do anything and 
everything the politicians ask them to in return for the given favours. 
In policy implementation, for example in tender allocation, the role of political influences was 
noticeably present. When Tun Daim Zainudin took over as the Minister of Finance (MOF), the 
bidding process for huge projects was revised. Under him, MOF now had total control over big 
projects, previously handled by the Ministry of Public Works (JKR). In some of these projects, 
there was no tender process taking place. Instead, MOF took up direct negotiation method with 
several contractors and suppliers. It was not uncommon to see that the civil servants would then 
just oblige the ministers’ orders and their political secretaries. Meanwhile, the Minister Secretary 
(KSU) and other heads of departments were but the extension of the minister’s team, as if 
projecting an image, among others, that the government would never change.  
KSU’s discretionary power is equally important and is one of the contributing factors to the very 
same problem. It needs to be highlighted here that the government’s funds are channelled to the 
heads of departments through allocation warrant for which politicians cannot utilize without 
                                                            
13 It is worth mentioning that the major problem does not lie with the government domination or the influential 
bureaucrats but the political executive domination. 
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getting prior approval from the former. However, in order to be in the ‘safe zone’, civil servants 
would rather go about doing their duty, to the tune of the concerned politicians and subsequently, 
gladly implement what has been decided by the latter. They prefer not to be in loggerheads with 
the politicians. In other words, they are more than willing to be participants of the politics of 
patronage. A few KSUs greatly benefitted from such political patronage and they retired from 
the service having amassed more wealth and fortune than what they normally do. A number of 
them were also involved in businesses, taken up as a token, for the various favours they extended 
to the politicians while they were still the KSUs. 
3.2 ‘Ethnicized Civil Service’ 
Reflecting the strong domination of Malay ethnic of the Malaysian civil service, Means writes: 
“through the operation of Malay ‘special rights’ giving recruitment and 
promotion preferences to Malays, the whole structure of government services has 
become a bastion of Malay power and the major avenue for Malay professional 
and economic advancement. This pattern is particularly pronounced at the higher 
administrative and policy-making levels where Malay dominance comes closer to 
reality (Means 1991: 297-298).  
Such a tendency is deeply rooted in the history of the country especially since the British 
colonial days. And it still prevails in most of the country’s policy until today. When Malaya 
gained its independence, taking into account the racial backgrounds in the service, the policy of 
‘Malayanised civil service’ was immediately put into full swing so as to increase substantially 
the number of Malays as well as to reduce the expatriates. This policy has been pursued so 
aggressively that, as of today, Malays participation in the service far outnumbers those of the 
other ethnics. With the exception in certain professional and expert services such as medicine, 
legal, judiciary and public works, the big gap is especially obvious in top management level. 
However, this policy is still justifiable since it has its root in Article 153 of the federal 
constitution which states about the “special privileges” of the Malays and Bumiputra (the 
indigenous people of the Malay Archipelago) of which main purpose, among others, is to 
alleviate the levels of education of the Bumiputra poor so that they can equal the other ethnics’. 
In other words, the constitution allows for the application of quota system in anything including 
positions in the civil service. It all boils down to the quota system and therefore, the justification 
for increasing the number of Malays in the civil service. 
However, the problem did not lie in the quota system but the way the quota system was exercised 
and this scenario was made even more obvious in the post-NEP (New Economic Policy 1970-
1990) implementation where the numbers of non-Bumiputra officers decreased considerably 
(Means 1986). According to SPA (Civil Service Commission 2003), there were 29.7 % Chinese 
civil servants in 1980, which went down to 8.2% in 2003, while the numbers of the Indians 
dwindled from 9.8% in 1980 to 5.2% in 2003. According to SPA, the leading cause was that, 
after independence, many of the positions of the retired non-Bumiputra civil servants were left 
vacant (Lim 2002). At present, 91% of the workforce in the civil servants is of Malay ethnic and 
this is tantamount to creating difficulties and challenges in the future, especially to the policy 
makers who are political leaders and senior officers in the run (Rais 2006). In fact, the concern 
over the un-representative nature of the country’s bureaucracy will continue to be a factor so 
integral in the policy making process as well civil service in general. In a research on 
relationship of the factors influencing perception and the role of top management with the 
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minority group it represented, Selden (1997) found that ethnic factor was a factor that played a 
key role in determining whether the administrator would perceive his/her role as an advocate of a 
representative of minority interests. In another research, Ahmad Marthada (2004) also found that 
administrators working with the minority ethnic in any given public service department was less 
active in advocating their orientation as the representatives of their own ethnics.  
Notwithstanding Article 153 provision in the federal constitution, the rise of a Malay dominated 
civil service has inevitably generated concerns with regard to the legality and the level of the 
bureaucrats’ responsibility (Lim 2003: 16-24). Lim’s concerns were not new. As a matter of fact, 
Ho (1999: 26-29), also voiced his concern about the bureaucrats accountability. These represent 
some of the serious issues that never cease to generate interests of the academia world in any 
discourse over civil service, especially when it comes to the inescapable racial consideration in 
the context of Malaysia.  
In spite of the Malay bureaucrats previously being highly decorated in recognition of their top 
level of professionalism, if the current disappointing performance and quality of the civil service 
is taken into account, such a positive perception does not seem to augur well with the present 
society. Among the contributing factors are ethnic-based consideration for appointment and 
promotion within the service. It is feared that such will have an adverse effect to the service 
especially when the less than qualified Malay officers being favoured more than the qualified 
non-Malay ones (Khoo 2005: 29). Also, at the expense of efficiency and effectiveness, the 
bureaucracy so dominated by the Malay ethnic will unwittingly leave a serious impact onto the 
country’s multi-ethnics society, that is, in terms of unequal treatment and distribution of benefits 
to the unrepresented ethnics (Lim 2002). Despite the absence of any empirical study on this 
subject, it is not something unusual to hear about grouses, complaints and grumbles coming from 
the non-Bumiputra ethnics with regards to the unfair treatment they receive from the Malay-
dominated civil service. Some of the cases involving the police force ill-treatment against the 
non-Malay inmates, Malay School Headmasters not sensitive to non-Malay pupils’ needs, lax 
poverty eradication program especially among the Indians and many others (Lim 2002).  
Moreover, a highly unrepresentative bureaucracy has the potential to create severe negative 
implications; not only will it run counter against efforts to strengthen national unity but also 
against the popular support for the government itself. The former Malaysian fourth Prime 
Minister, (Tun) Dr. Mahathir acknowledged that the need was even more urgent for a 
‘sufficiently representative bureaucracy’ as opposed to ‘a fully representative bureaucracy’ to 
promote national unity. In a newspaper interview, Mahathir was quoted as saying: 
 
“The Government wants an increase in non-Bumiputra representation in the civil 
service to promote national unity. Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad said today there was a need to ensure all races were sufficiently 
represented in all levels in the service. “We are a bit worried that there are not 
too many non-Malays – that is Chinese and Indians – in the government service”.  
… Fair representation of the races should not only be restricted to government 
service. It should be reflected in the private sector as well” (NST 20 Mei 2001). 
It is very unfortunate that after decades of NEP implementation, in terms of ownership and 
employment in the private sector, the Malays are still lagging far behind as opposed to the 
Chinese and Indian. This, in fact, is instrumental behind the Malays’ objection against 
representative bureaucracy in the civil service. Notwithstanding the validity of the Malays’ 
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concern, the practice of ‘Malays first’ policy and their over-representation in bureaucracy still 
need to be reviewed. Lim (2002: 45), however, argues that a sufficiently representative 
bureaucracy in which the Malays command no less than 2/3 majority in every sector of the civil 
service is more accurate compared to a fully representative bureaucracy in the context of 
Malaysia. In the long term, when the Malays employment figures increase substantially in the 
private sector, the non-Malays participation in bureaucracy will subsequently follow suit. This 
will turn both sectors into a balanced or closed representative, making it fully suited to a multi-
ethnic society composition. (Lim 2002: 46).  
Still, Mohd Azmi Abdul Hamid (2006), the President of TERAS that represents all Malays non-
governmental organizations (NGO) cautioned that any attempt to review ethnic composition 
needed to be carried out carefully, fairly and comprehensively. Besides, although the public 
sector is dominated by the Malays, other aspects also need to be considered thoroughly. The 
Bumiputra ratio in professional category (not including teachers, lecturers, writers and artists) 
was at 47.5 % in 2005 as opposed to 77.6% of the Chinese and 69.2% of the Indian. Bumiputra 
ratio of accountants in 2005 was 20.8 %, the Chinese 73.6% while the Indian 4.4% (Malaysiakini 
30/9/2006). Such a big gap between the ethnics is also visible in commercial buildings 
ownership, poverty incidence, and household income average and equity ownership. These 
obviously indicate that the Malays command of the economy is far below than that of the non-
Malays. Mohd Azmi, however, also called certain parties not prioritize an ethnic over other 
ethnics in any public policy. He argued that would be tantamount to unfairness and injustice. 
Mohd Azmi asserted:  
“(I)s it justifiable if we decide to forego a certain pro-ethnic policy for an open 
market policy in the globalization agenda that falls beyond our control?” 
“..the question is not us debating the issue over figures being the reasons why a 
policy should be changed or not, however it is about unfair distribution of the 
country’s wealth among the ethnic composition which will create unhealthy 
situations in social as well as political aspects …” 
“..hiding behind a research in order to propose suggested policies that for certain 
is in favour of an already strong minority will bring about injustice which will 
consequently lead to instability...” 
“The fact that matters is that we should not fall into the trap of debates over NEP 
achievement only in terms of figures and numbers. We, on the other hand, should 
see that inter-ethnic economic distribution matters as much for intra-ethnic. As 
the implication resulting from ethnic gap in equity ownership is just as important 
to help protects social and political stability, the same can be said of the intra-
ethnic divide (Malaysiakini 30/9/2006). 
With regard to this ethnic issue, despite the fact that the country is enjoying its political stability, 
the ethnic identity has become reinforced to the extent that neutrality of bureaucracy and its 
accountability to all ethnic groups is questionable (Gonzales & Mendoza 2002; Haque 2007). 
This has also been a political issue that seems never cease to exist and as such needs to be treated 
carefully. One of the sensible approaches to dealing with the issue is to see it through non-
political paradigm i.e. by determining the source of the problem and not the symptom.  
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4.0 New Mechanisms of Public Governance 
Inspired by the neo-liberal economy school, New Public Management (NPM) is generating 
enough force to begin to be seen as a powerful force capable to set off rapid and unprecedented 
changes in the civil service in both the developed countries and the developing ones. It has been 
referred to as managerialisme, market-based public administration and result-based management 
(Pollitt 1990; Hood 1991). NPM can simply be understood as the application of the values and 
principles of the private sector and business philosophy in the public sector with the major 
purpose of improving the latter’s efficiency, effectiveness and performance. The values include 
managerialisme, downsizing, decentralization, cost-saving, de-bureaucratization, competition 
and privatization (Hood 1991; Pollitt 2003). The application of NPM serves as an indication that 
good governance has to do with more flexible public service management made to be oriented 
towards producing results and disengaging from traditional administration method based on 
tedious legal and process system. Nonetheless, the extent with which NPM’s objective can be 
truly realized remains a questionable end. Today’s world fierce competition among capitalist to 
secure profits has resulted in hardship for people the world over. Why then, one would ask, 
Malaysia still wish to dance according to the neo-liberal’s tune?  
 
Malaysia, since a few decades ago, has witnessed several reforms introduced and applied into a 
multitude of its civil service bureaucratic and management aspects. Among the reforms were 
restructuring, privatising and corporatizing several public agencies, quality based management 
and reviewing civil servants system and financial management (read Common 2001: 177-180). 
The restructuring exercise of the public agencies, otherwise known as downsizing, was first put 
into practice in mid 1980s. It was called as ‘the new shift of paradigm’ from which the 
government had transformed its traditional role of being the main service provider into being the 
facilitator. As a result, a number of courses of actions were pursued in order to downsize the size 
of the civil service. This included termination of new posts, doing away with vacant posts in non-
critical fields, integration of state services with those of the federal, privatization of public 
enterprises and establishment of regulatory bodies to supervise and monitor the privatization 
process (Ahmad Sarji 1996).  
 
Privatization, among all the reforms, was the most significant one. It had greatly helped to spawn 
the most noticeable and encouraging impacts to the government restructuring exercise. Through 
the creation of monopoly system, its main objective was to ease the government payroll and 
administrative loads by compressing the government networks of services and reducing the size 
and the presence of public services. These steps had as well served to broaden the privatization’s 
concept and scope. Overall, other than succeeding in downsizing bureaucracy, privatization also 
managed to save RM130 billion of the government’s coffers (the cost of operational and model 
expenses) (Siddiquee 2006). In spite of the positive impacts, privatization was still far from 
being the ultimate solution. It too came with its own flaws. One of them was the issue of public 
accountability. Malaysia was not the only country suffering from the flaws. The similar 
shortcomings also affected many other countries, including the developed ones such as New 
Zealand through its Quangos exercise14. Gregory (2004: 160) states: 
 
                                                            
14 The term ‘quangos’ is an acronym of quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations used to refer to public 
agencies responsible to develop, manage and execute public policy under the supervision of an appointed 
individuals, not through voting or board members (Dubois & Contandriopoulos 2007: 781) 
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“...the reforms also sought to enhance the operating autonomy of public 
executives,  particularly those in so-called ‘crown entities’ (essentially parastatal 
‘quangos’), which are not part of the Public Service, but which are single-
purpose agencies administering a wide range of regulatory, quasi-judicial, 
service delivery and commercial functions. Many of these functions were 
previously administered within Public Service departments, so their ‘hiving off’ to 
crown entities whose government boards are appointed by the political executive 
has widened the potential scope for what many might see as ‘politicization’ in 
New Zealand government administration.” 
 
Privatization is not the only guilty party. Fundamentally, the problem had already begun even 
before privatization program was launched. As a matter of fact, the nucleus of the problem was 
created the moment the Malaysian government set up of a number of corporatized bodies in the 
1970s to facilitate and speed up the implementation of NEP programs.  The problem came from 
the status of the corporate bodies’ employees for whom the country’s constitution did not 
consider as part of the civil service force despite their functional similarities with those of the 
other civil service agencies (Abdul Aziz Bari 2003: 80). These bodies were disillusioned as to 
who they should be accountable to. To make matters worse, the constitution was even ‘silent’ i.e. 
it did not provide details as to the controlling mechanisms of government officials who misused 
the people’s funds.  
 
Even more confusing was when several public-funded companies, through privatization, were 
considered to be legally private entities (Abdul Aziz Bari 2003: 80). Paradoxically, many 
companies falling within this category were set up legally but were beyond the reach of 
Parliament sanction. Rumours of abuse of power and fund were ripe as to the implementation 
method, the forms of units to be privatized and to whom they were to be privatized for. The 
rumours did not stop there. The privatization program was also accused of becoming the bastion 
to serve the interests of certain individuals who consequently paved the way for easy and open 
practise of corruption and bribery from within and without the system. There was no formality 
for having open tender system, bailing out privatized units using public fund and nationalizing 
privatized units (buying the unit’s share below market price) (Gomez & Jomo 1999; Siddiquee 
2006). Jomo (2003) calls the privatization timeframe i.e. more than 20 years both as the era of 
privatizing lucrative assets and profits while socializing the losses and liabilities. 
 
Personnel management saw changes befitting NPM i.e. Skim Saraan Baru (SSB) or New 
Employment Scheme. Used to measure and appraise civil servants annual performance 
individually, the scheme is regarded as very helpful because it rewarded high performers who 
will then be qualified to be considered for promotions in terms of post and salary scale 
movement. This appraisal method is based on annual target job achievement and several other 
criteria (output-oriented) set out beforehand at the beginning of each respective year by the 
employees’ superiors. Introduced in 1992, the scheme links performance with reward. It replaces 
linear and curved salary scales with salary increment based on an employee’s annual work 
performance (Siddiquee 2006).  
 
All tasks to be appraised in a performance appraisal are put under a purview of a panellist 
empowered with power to review, rate an employee’s performance, determine the salary 
increment movement and ascertained the numbers of employees who qualified for salary 
increment. For certain categories, there is no predetermined quota (Sarji 1996). However, the 
changes proposed under SSB gave rise to complaints and dissatisfaction among the civil 
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servants. Consequently, in November 2002, a complementary new scheme was put in place. It 
was called Skim Saraan Malaysia (SSM) or Malaysia’s Employment Scheme. SSM was not 
meant to replace SSB. It was as an option to the civil servants who refused SSB. As such, SSM 
was expected to resolve problems associated with SSB by offering more attractive salary, higher 
prospect for promotion and much improved terms of employment. SSM, however, was not due 
without faults. Consequently, under the 11th national budget (2010), the government has decided 
to terminate SSM. It will be replaced by a new scheme in June 2011. 
 
Yet, reforms in civil service employment have not been able to resolve problems associated with 
the basic aspects such as meritocracy and fairness in employment matters. Only little 
improvements have been made so far. In reality, quota system still prevails whereby 90% of the 
posts in the civil service are still reserved for the Malay ethnic while the other ethnics continue to 
fail to get posts they deserve. Besides, SSB remains vulnerable to abusive decision making, 
uncertainty and unfairness in performance appraisal process (Siddiquee 2010). What is most 
feared, according to Peters & Pierre (2004: 286) is politicization of the civil service. It occurs 
when individuals empowered to conduct performance appraisal only appraise their own ‘kind’ to 
be the highest achievers. Peters (2004: 133) highlights this predicament in the United States of 
America’s civil service: 
 
“The emphasis on performance management that is at the heart of President 
Bush’s management agenda is therefore a potential backdoor opportunity for the 
politicization of the federal work force, or at least increased political influence 
over the actions of career employees of the federal government. Performance in 
public sector organizations is to some extent quantifiable, but it is also to some 
extent subjective. Therefore, the managers who are permitted to determine the 
extent to which individuals or organizations have performed well are able to 
shape the meaning of ‘performance’. The General Accounting Office as a part of 
the negotiations surrounding the Government Performance and Results Act to 
some extent defines the standards of performance for federal government 
organizations but the standards for individual contributions to the organization 
remain more subjective”.  
 
Apart from that, SSB as an output based performance appraisal is relatively new to civil servants 
in Malaysia (Siddiquee 2010). Its application witnesses the beginning of a formal system which 
involves new practise by both the appraiser and the appraisee. This, in addition to continuous 
real performance appraisal tradition, requires undivided commitment for predetermined 
objectives (Siddiquee 2010).  
 
Such a performance appraisal reminds Hofstede with the extent of the suitability of such an 
outcome-based appraisal with the culture of ‘power distance15’, considered to highly prevalent in 
Malaysia (Siddiquee 2010). Since it involves the appraiser discussing openly an employee’s 
performance, it is seen much against a norm of the society i.e. it openly damages an appraisee’s 
                                                            
15 ‘Power distance’ refers to prevailing but accepted inequality by the society regardless of whether or not an 
individual is powerful or not. The high score of ‘power distance’ indicates the society accepts unequal power 
distribution while at the same time fully understands the members’ position in the system. Low score of ‘power 
distance’ then means that power is shared and distributed equally. It also forces members of the society to see 
themselves as equal. 
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dignity and self-worth. (Hofstede 1991; Siddiquee 2010). As such, the weaker ‘power distance’ 
is, the more likely the employees are willing to obey their superiors’ orders without much regard 
to their works’ accountability (Rahman 2006). Weakness is also ubiquitous in examination 
designed to measure civil servants’ performances. Examination results can be altered to ensure 
that the numbers of employees who will be qualified for salary increment is not less than 5%. 
Accordingly, the examination system eventually does not depend on the final results. In other 
words, performance principle is not put in the right place. In fact, this is one of the major 
examples how the basic purpose of performance appraisal has to give way for political 
manoeuvres (McCourt 2006; Siddiquee 2006). That, is one of the good proofs of showing how a 
good intention can be distorted when political consideration commands more leverage 
(Siddiquee 2010). Furthermore, in other levels, ministers and their political emissaries will also 
be evaluated by way of their respective organizational performances. Peters & Pierre (2004) adds 
that such an appraisal method can become more intense especially when the politicians’ control 
mechanism becomes even more stringent. In sum, the pressure for quantifiable appraisal, though 
still largely a subjective process, is becoming more popular with the removal of most restrictions 
concerning personnel matters (that have been politicized) which cannot be used any longer to 
serve the politicians’ interests (Peters & Pierre (2004). 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
 
Modern public administration demands that public administrators, especially senior civil 
servants, posses greater freedom to exercise their discretionary power in the real sense just as it 
is demanded by constitutional principles and the spirit of democracy. However, it is difficult for 
senior civil servants to objectively separate public interests from those of personal especially if 
the political system is long dominated by politicians. Certainly, there are many weaknesses in the 
society such as ethnicised political system and new administrative mechanism based on neo-
liberal being abused by certain parties to gain more wealth and power. The last Malaysia’s 
national election in March 2008 had given numerous lessons to the civil servants. They have 
learned their lessons well and are now readjusting themselves to suit the new surrounding 
circumstances. The politicians are not spared either. The principle is the same, that is there must 
always be a difference between the appointed and the elected through election because some of 
them will remain while some will have to leave. Only from this sensible sense will accountability 
in the civil service be built and assured. 
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